PART I
WHEREIN ARE EXPLAINED AND STATED VARIOUS TERMS AND THINGS BELONGING TO THE SUBJECT OF THE ENSUING DISCOURSE
SECTION I - Concerning the nature of the will
SECTION II - Concerning the determination of the will
SECTION III - Concerning the meaning of the terms necessity, impossibility, inability, etc.; and of contingence
SECTION IV - Of the distinction of natural and moral necessity, and inability.
SECTION V - Concerning the notion of liberty, and of moral agency.
PART II
WHEREIN IT IS CONSIDERED WHETHER THERE IS OR CAN BE ANY SUCH SORT OF FREEDOM OF WILL, AS THAT WHEREIN ARMINIANS PLACE THE ESSENCE OF THE LIBERTY OF ALL MORAL AGENTS; AND WHETHER ANY SUCH THING EVER WAS OR CAN BE CONCEIVED OF.
SECTION I - Showing the manifest inconsistency of the Arminian notion of liberty of will, consisting in the will’s self-determining power.
SECTION II - Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered.
SECTION III - Whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its existence.
SECTION IV - Whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul.
SECTION V - Showing that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.
SECTION VI - Concerning the will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the mind.
SECTION VII - Concerning the notion of liberty of will, consisting in indifference.
SECTION VIII - Concerning the supposed liberty of the will, as opposite to all necessity.
SECTION IX - Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understanding.
SECTION X - Volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives: with particular observations on the great inconsistency of Mr. Chubb’s assertions and reasonings about the freedom of the will.
SECTION XI - The evidence of God’s certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents.
SECTION XII - God’s certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions as is without all necessity.
SECTION XIII - Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty.
PART III
WHEREIN IS INQUIRED, WHETHER ANY SUCH LIBERTY OF WILL AS ARMINIANS HOLD, BE NECESSARY TO MORAL AGENCY, VIRTUE, AND VICE, PRAISE AND DISPRAISE, ETC.
SECTION I - God's Moral Excellency, necessary, yet virtuous and praiseworthy
SECTION II - The acts of the will, of the human soul of Jesus Christ; necessarily holy, yet truly virtuous, praiseworthy, rewardable, etc.
SECTION III - The case of such as are given up of God to sin, and of fallen man in general, proves moral necessity and inability to be consistent with blameworthiness.
SECTION IV - Command and obligation to obedience, consistent with moral inability to obey.
SECTION V - That sincerity of desires and endeavors, which, is supposed to excuse in the nonperformance of things in themselves good, particularly considered.
SECTION VI - Liberty of indifference, not only not necessary to virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of liberty and moral agency.
SECTION VII - Arminian notions of moral agency inconsistent with all influence of motive and Inducement, in either virtuous or vicious actions.
PART IV
THE REASONING OF THE ARMINIAN VIEW OF LIBERTY
SECTION I - The essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart and acts of the will lies not in their cause, but their nature.
SECTION II - Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning considered.
SECTION III- Whether any event whatsoever, and volition in particular, can come to pass without a cause of its existence.
SECTION IV- Whether volition can arise without a cause, through the activity of the nature of the soul.
SECTION V - Showing that if the things asserted in these Evasions should be supposed to be true, they are altogether impertinent, and cannot help the cause of Arminian liberty; and how, this being the state of the case, Arminian writers are obliged to talk inconsistently.
SECTION VI - Concerning the will determining in things which are perfectly indifferent in the view of the mind.
SECTION VII - Concerning the notion of liberty of will, consisting in indifference.
SECTION VIII - Concerning the supposed liberty of the will, as opposite to all necessity.
SECTION IX - Of the connection of the acts of the will with the dictates of the understanding.
SECTION X - Volition necessarily connected with the influence of motives: with particular observations on the great inconsistency of Mr. Chubb’s assertions and reasonings about the freedom of the will.
SECTION XI - The evidence of God’s certain foreknowledge of the volitions of moral agents.
SECTION XII - God’s certain foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral agents, inconsistent with such a contingence of those volitions as is without all necessity.
SECTION XIII - Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty.
SECTION XIV - Whether we suppose the volitions of moral agents to be connected with any thing antecedent, or not, yet they must be necessary in such a sense as to overthrow Arminian liberty.